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In this paper we study optimal policies in an environment where search frictions both in
labor and goods markets give rise to unemployment and fiat money, as in Berentsen,
Menzio, and Wright (American Economic Review, 2011). The underlying frictions that
give rise to endogenous unemployment and fiat money also result in inefficient outcomes.
Here we show that efficiency can be restored whenever lump sum monetary transfers are
possible and a decentralized production subsidy financed by money printing and a
vacancy subsidy financed by a dividend tax exist. This is the case even when the Hosios
and Friedman rules do not hold.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The relationship between inflation and unemployment has been extensively ana-
lyzed over the past 50 years. One of the most robust monetary features of post-war
U.S. data is their positive correlation.1 Many economists view this as an important
fact that has to be taken into account in conducting monetary policy. Understanding
the origins of the correlations associated with the Phillips curve is a crucial first
step to understand the implications of that relationship when designing policies.
Given that agents trading in frictionless Walrasian markets do not require fiat
money and are always employed, environments with underlying frictions are
necessary in studying the relationship between unemployment and inflation. The
literature has departed from the standard Arrow–Debreu world and has considered
different frictions. Within a fully flexible cash-in-advance framework, Cooley and
Quadrini (1999) integrate a model of equilibrium unemployment. When price
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rigidities are considered, Walsh (2003), among others, studies the relationship
between inflation and unemployment. When search-theoretic models of money
are considered, Lehmann (2006), Kumar (2008) and Berentsen et al. (2011),
among others, explore the relationship between inflation and unemployment.
Despite the increasing use of search-theoretic models of unemployment, little
is known about the nature of optimal fiscal and monetary policies in this class of
models. An exception is Cooley and Quadrini (2004), who study optimal monetary
policy in a model that integrates the modern theory of unemployment with firms
facing cash-in-advance constraints to purchase intermediate inputs. These authors
show that when the economy is subject to productivity shocks, the optimal policy
is procyclical, and with commitment, the optimal inflation rate is inversely related
to the bargaining power of workers. Within the search-theoretic models of money,
Lehmann (2006) shows that the optimal monetary growth rate decreases with the
workers’ bargaining power, the level of unemployment benefits, and the payroll
tax rate. Finally, Berentsen et al. (2007) study optimal monetary policy in an
economy with endogenous search decisions. They show that the same frictions
that give fiat money a positive value generate an inefficient quantity of goods in
each trade and an inefficient number of trades. The Friedman rule eliminates the
first inefficiency and the Hosios rule the second. A monetary equilibrium attains
the social optimum if and only if both rules are satisfied. When they cannot be
satisfied simultaneously, optimal monetary policy achieves only the second best.
In this paper we follow the tradition of search-theoretic models of money and
unemployment and study the design of optimal monetary and fiscal policies. The
underlying environment is based on Berentsen et al. (2011). In each period, agents
trade in three distinct submarkets where economic activity takes place. In two of
these markets, trade takes place bilaterally and agents face search frictions. In the
labor market, unmatched agents become unemployment, and in the specialized
goods market, fiat money is essential in that it expands the set of feasible trades
because of anonymity. In the last submarket, agents trade in a frictionless Arrow–
Debreu type of market.
In monetary exchanges, agents pay a cost today (production) to receive a future
benefit (money that can be used to purchase goods in future trades), thus facing the
standard intertemporal distortion found in monetary models. The other distortions
in the environment are a direct consequence of the properties of Nash’s solution
to the bargaining problem when agents trade goods for money and the matching
frictions in the labor market.2 Here we abstract from revenue-raising motives to
focus on the welfare-enhancing properties of optimal policy. This paper tries to
answer the following questions: Can fiscal and monetary policy restore efficiency
of equilibria? Is the Friedman rule an optimal policy once unemployment exists
and fiscal policy is available?
In this paper we propose different fiscal and monetary policies that can restore
efficiency of monetary equilibrium even when the Hosios and Friedman rules
do not hold. We find that production subsidies on the goods exchanged in the
specialized goods market, paid in money, can be used to increase production in the
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decentralized market, but they may be inflationary. If costless lump-sum monetary
transfers are available, these can be used to extract the money introduced through
the subsidy and thus inflation can easily be contained. Thus a simple combination
of production subsidy and inflation rate can help to achieve efficiency in the
specialized goods market. If the Hosios rule is satisfied, efficiency is achieved in
both markets. However, if the Hosios rule is not satisfied, an efficient specialized
goods production subsidy does not imply that efficiency in the labor market is
achieved. We then propose a vacancy subsidy financed by a dividend tax that
achieves efficiency even when the Hosios rule does not hold.
2. MODEL
Our model builds on Berentsen et al. (2011). Time is discrete and continues
forever. There are two types of agents, firms and households, indexed by f and h.
The set of households denoted by h belong to the [0, 1] interval; the set of firms
denoted by f is arbitrarily large, but not all are active at any point in time. House-
holds work, consume, and enjoy utility, whereas firms maximize profits and pay
dividends.
In each period, there are three distinct markets where economic activity takes
place: a labor market in the spirit of Mortensen and Pissarides, a specialized goods
market in the spirit of Kiyotaki and Wright, and a general market in the spirit of
Arrow and Debreu. We refer these submarkets as LM, DM, and CM, respectively.
The timing of the environment is such that LM convenes first, then DM, and
finally CM. In the first subperiod, agents enter the labor market with different
employment status. Note that in the LM market, h and f can match bilaterally
to create a job. To denote the outcome of that bilateral meeting we have an
index, e, that represents the employment status: e = 1 if an agent is matched
and e = 0 otherwise. Employed workers are matched with firms to produce
output y, whereas unemployed workers do not produce. After the labor market
takes place, both types of workers (employed and unemployed) who are matched
enter into the next submarket, DM, where they purchase the goods that have
been just produced, whereas the identity of agents is private information, ruling
out credit. In the final subperiod, employed (unemployed) workers receive their
wage payments (unemployment benefits), as well as dividend income from firms.
Through exchanges in a Walrasian market, workers acquire consumption of a
general good and rebalance their currency to carry into the next period.
We define value functions for LM, DM, and CM submarkets as
U
j
e (z), V
j
e (z),W
j
e (z) respectively, which depend on type j ∈ {h, f }, employment
status e ∈ {0, 1}, and real money balances z ∈ [0,∞), where z = m/p and p
is the current price level. As in Berentsen et al. (2011), we adopt the following
convention for measuring real balances. When an agent brings in m dollars to the
CM, the agent then takes zˆ = mˆ/p out of that market and into the next period.
In the next CM market the price level is pˆ, so the real value of the money is zˆρˆ,
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FIGURE 1. Timing.
where ρˆ =p/pˆ converts zˆ into units of the numeraire general consumption good
X in that market.
In addition to firms and households, there exists a government that conducts
monetary and fiscal policies. In the CM, the government collects dividend taxes
to finance vacancy subsidies and unemployment benefits. The government also
conducts monetary policy by printing money at different times of the day. In
particular, at the end of the DM, the government provides a monetary subsidy
on production exchanged in DM. On the other hand, at the end of the CM, new
money is injected through a lump-sum transfer (or tax). This operating procedure
for monetary policy allows redistribution of resources between buyers and sellers.
See Figure 1 for the exact timing.
2.1. Household’s Problem
We now examine households’ value functions in each of the subperiods, starting
with the final one. A household that enters the CM with employment status e and
real money holdings z chooses consumption and real money holdings for the next
period, zˆ, to solve the following problem:
Whe (z) = max
X,zˆ
{X + (1 − e)l + βUhe (zˆ)},
s.t. X = ew + (1 − e)b+  (1 − τd) + z − zˆ + τz,
where X is the general CM consumption good, l represents leisure,  denotes
dividend income, b is the unemployment benefit, τd represents the dividend income
tax rate, and τz is the lump-sum real monetary transfers. We have chosen to consider
a dividend tax because the dividend payment from firms to households acts just
like a lump-sum transfer, thus not affecting decisions at the margin. This is the
case because households already own the firm and households do not trade their
ownership. Moreover, given that households have quasi-linear preferences, a tax
on dividends is less distortionary than a sales tax, which affects the consumption
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of general goods and money-holding decisions. Thus a dividend tax is more likely
to help achieve efficiency than a sales tax.
Substituting X into the objective function, we obtain the following simplified
problem:
Whe (z) = max
zˆ
{ew + (1 − e)(l + b)+  (1 − τd) + z − zˆ + τz + βUhe (zˆ)}. (1)
As in Lagos and Wright (2005), with quasi-linear preferences the optimal choice of
future real balances, zˆ, is independent of the current ones, z. It depends, however,
on the workers’ employment status e. To determine this link, let us now explore
the problem of a representative household in the DM, which is given by
V he (z) = αhν(q) + αhWhe [ρ(z − d)] + (1 − αh)Whe (ρz), (2)
where ν(q) denotes the utility that a buyer obtains when he or she consumes q units
of the specialized DM good, d represents the monetary payment from buyers to
sellers to obtain the DM good, and αh is the probability of trading. The probability
of trade is given by a matching function αh = M(B, S)/B, where B and S are
the measures of buyers and sellers in the market. Assuming thatM(B, S) satisfies
the constant–returns to scale property, αh =M(Q, 1)/Q, where Q = B/S is the
queue length or market tightness. All households participate in the DM market, so
B = 1; only firms with e = 1 participate, so S = 1−u, where u is unemployment
out of the labor market. Thus, αh =M(1, 1 − u).
Now, exploiting the linearity of Whe (z), we can rewrite the DM value function
as follows:
V he (z) = αh[ν(q) − ρd] + Whe (0) + ρz. (3)
To close the household problem, we need to specify the choices of the repre-
sentative household in LM, which are characterized by
Uh1 (z) = V h1 (z) + δ[V h0 (z) − V h1 (z)] (4)
and
Uh0 (z) = V h0 (z) + λh[V h1 (z) − V h0 (z)],
where δ denotes the exogenous rate at which matches are destroyed and λh is the
endogenous rate at which they are created. The latter is determined by another
standard matching function, λh = N (u, v)/u, where u is unemployment and v is
the number of vacancies posted by firms at the beginning at the LM market.
Implicit in this setup is that wages are determined when f and h meet in the
LM, although they are paid in the next CM market. Moreover, wages can be
renegotiated each period.
Now that all the value functions for the different submarkets have been specified,
the problem of the representative household can be rewritten as follows:
Whe (z) = Ie + z + max
zˆ
{−zˆ + βαh[ν(q) − ρd] + βρzˆ} + βEWheˆ (0), (5)
OPTIMAL MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICIES 1335
where Ie = ew + (1 − e)(l + b)+  (1 − τd)+ τz and EWheˆ (0) is the expectation
with respect to the next period’s employment status.
2.2. Firm’s Problem
Firms carry no real balance out of the CM. The problem of a firm in the LM is
given by
U
f
1 = V f1 + δ(V f0 − V f1 ) (6)
and
U
f
0 = V f0 + λf (V f1 − V f0 ),
where λf is the endogenous rate at which matches are created, which is given
by λf = N (u, v)/v. By constant returns, λf = N (u/v, 1), where v/u is labor
market tightness.
In the first subperiod, firms with e = 0 have no production activities. If a firm
enters the LM with a job match, it can produce y units of output in the LM, which
can then be sold in the DM with a probability αf . The problem of the firm in the
DM is given by
V
f
1 = αfWf1 [y − c(q), ρd(1 + sq)] + (1 − αf )Wf1 (y, 0), (7)
where sq is the monetary subsidy to production in DM and c(q) is a transformation
cost with 100% depreciation, as in Berentsen et al. (2011). Any leftover y − c(q)
is carried into the CM to be sold as a general good. Thus one could interpret X
and q as the same physical good, which a firm can store across markets, bearing
in mind that consumers generally value it differently in the two markets.
The CM value of a firm with inventory, X, real money balances, z, and wage
commitment, w, is given by
W
f
1 (X, z) = X + z − w + βUf1 . (8)
Thus the DM value of a firm is given by
V
f
1 (z) = R − w + β[δV f0 + (1 − δ)V f1 ], (9)
where R = y + αf [(1 + sq)ρd − c(q)] is the expected revenue.
To model entry, any firm with e = 0 can pay k, in units of X, in the CM to enter
the next labor market. Thus we have that
W
f
0 = max{0,−k + a + βλf V f1 + β(1 − λf )V f0 }, (10)
where a denotes the vacancy subsidy that the government gives to firms. The
free entry condition then implies that k − a = βλf V f1 . Now taking into account
equation (9), we have that the entry condition becomes
k − a = βλf (R − w)
1 − β(1 − δ) .
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The resulting profits over all firms are then given by
	˜ = (1 − u)(R − w) − vk + va.
Because households own shares of all firms, profits define the dividend payment,
which is given by 	˜ =.3
2.3. The Government
In this environment, the government’s available monetary and fiscal policy tools
are used to attenuate the frictions in the economic environment. The government
pays unemployment benefits, b, and vacancy subsidies, a, which are financed by
dividend taxes, τd, in the CM market. Thus the fiscal budget constraint is given by
va + ub = τd ,
which holds at every date.
Following Gomis-Porqueras and Peralta-Alva (2010), the monetary authority
injects money at different times within a period to finance a production subsidy,
sq , in the DM as well as to affect the money supply at the end of CM. Thus the
corresponding monetary budget constrains are given by
(1 − u)sqρd = τDMM
(1 + τDM)(1 + τCM) = 1 + π,
where τDM (τCM) corresponds to the DM (CM) money growth rate, M is the money
supply, and π equals the inflation rate in the steady state. The production monetary
subsidy in DM is important, as a potential sales tax in DM would imply that the
government has access to a record-keeping device rendering money inessential
in this environment.4 Moreover, because the government can inject/withdraw fiat
money at different times, the production subsidy in DM together with the lump-
sum monetary transfers in CM redistribute resources from buyers to sellers. The
production subsidy is financed by money injection, τDM, and the size of the lump
sum transfer, τz, is determined by the end-of-period money injection/withdrawal
τCM for a given inflation rate.
The monetary production subsidy we consider can be mapped in real-life
economies to policies that prescribe paying interest to some money holders, in
our case firms. This type of policy prescription has a long tradition in monetary
economics and has been advocated by Tolley (1957) and Friedman (1959), among
others. Regarding the feasibility and implementability of this policy, Feinman
(1993) notes that the Federal Reserve has explicitly supported legislation au-
thorizing the payment of interest on reserves since the 1970s. Our paper then
reexamines an established monetary policy prescription in the new search models
of money and unemployment.
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3. PRICING MECHANISMS
To characterize the terms of trade, we need to specify the trading protocol in each
of the three markets. Following the literature, we consider price taking in the CM
and Nash bilateral bargaining in the LM and DM submarkets. Although one can
easily modify the model to allow other pricing options, we restrict our attention
to the generalized Nash bargaining solution. The reason for this choice is that we
can use the seller’s bargaining power as a proxy for the degree of competition in
the goods market, and examine how different market structures affect the implied
inflation–unemployment relation.
Nash bargaining has the property that an action taken by an agent that expands
the Pareto frontier can be punished for doing so, as first pointed out by Kalai
and Smorodinsky (1975).5 Thus, whenever Nash bargaining is the price-setting
mechanism, policy instruments, monetary or fiscal, have a role in attenuating this
“social inefficiency.” The actual prescription for optimal policy in environments
with a Nash price-setting mechanism crucially depends on how agents’ choices
affect the set of incentive-feasible outcomes.6 This type of “social inefficiency”
is especially important for monetary search models because money expands the
set of feasible trades, as emphasized by Aruoba et al. (2007). The Friedman rule
alone can not restore efficiency. This insight motivates our work in designing fiscal
and monetary policies that can attenuate both the intertemporal and bargaining
frictions in a search theoretic model of money.
3.1. Nash Bargaining in DM
Suppose that when a worker and firm meet in the DM, they bargain over the terms
of trade (q, d), subject to the worker’s cash constraint d ≤ z, where d is the
amount of real money balances the buyer gives to the seller in exchange for q. Let
φ denote the seller’s bargaining power. The solution is given by
max
q,d
[ν(q) − ρd]φ[ρd(1 + sq) − c(q)]1−φ s.t. d ≤ z and c(q) ≤ y.
We note that if c(q) ≤ y binds, efficiency can never be achieved regardless
of any government intervention. This is a direct consequence of the underlying
technology. Throughout the rest of the paper we do not consider this scenario.
The Nash bargaining solution is given a pair (q, d) that satisfies the following
conditions:
d = z and q = g−1(ρz),
where g(·) is defined as follows:
g(q) = φc(q)ν
′(q) + (1 − φ)ν(q)c′(q)
φ(1 + sq)ν ′(q) + (1 − φ)c′(q) .
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Given this bargaining outcome, we can rewrite the choice of zˆ by a household in
CM as
max
zˆ≥0
{−zˆ + βαhv[g−1(ρzˆ)] + β(1 − αh)ρzˆ},
and the solution to this latter problem is given by
1
βρ
= αh ν
′(q)
g′(q)
+ (1 − αh),
which can be rewritten using the Fisher equation, 1/β = (1 + i)ρ, as follows:
i
M(1, 1 − u) =
ν ′(q)
g′(q)
− 1, (11)
where i is the nominal interest rate. Equation (11) will be referred to as the LW
curve. This curve represents the (q, u) pairs that are consistent with the household
optimization problem. This curve determines the DM output, q, as in Lagos and
Wright (2005), except that in their model αh was fixed and now αh =M(1, 1−u).
Moreover, in this environment, the production subsidy, sq , also alters the incentives
to produce in DM. The properties of the LW curve follow the well-known results
that simple conditions guarantee that ν
′(q)
g′(q) is monotone, so there is a unique q that
solves the previous condition with ∂q
∂u
< 0.
PROPOSITION 1. Let q∗ solve ν ′(q∗) = c′(q∗). For all i > 0 the LW curve
slopes downward in (u, q) space, with u = 0 and sq = 0 implying q ∈ (0, q∗) and
u = 1 implying q = 0. As i → 0, q → q0 for all u < 1, where q0 is independent
of u.
We refer the reader to the Appendix for the proofs of all our results.
An increase in u affects q because higher unemployment makes it less attractive
to be a buyer by adversely affecting the probability and/or terms of trade. The
different subsidies considered in this paper change the incentives to produce more
and possibly increase welfare. The vacancy subsidy provides an incentive for firms
to post more vacancies, which in turn affects how successful matches occur in the
labor market. The fact that more successful matches are possible increases the
total amount of resources in the decentralized market.
LEMMA 1. The LW curve shifts upward, i.e., q is increasing for any given
u, when the monetary subsidy to production sq increases or the inflation rate π
decreases.
According to the Fisher equation 1/β = (1 + i)ρ, the LW curve moves upward
when the inflation rate π = 1/ρ − 1 decreases. This effect is intuitive: a high i
increases the cost of holding money, and thus lowers the trading quantity, which
is constrained by the money holding of buyers. When the subsidy to production
sq increases, a firm has a larger incentive to recruit in the labor market, and this
helps to reduce unemployment.
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3.2. Nash Bargaining in LM
In the labor market, when a firm with a vacancy meets with an unemployed worker
they bargain over wage, w, with threat points given by their continuation values.
Recall that the difference in value functions between different employment status
for a household are given by
Uh1 − Uh0 = (1 − δ − λh)[V h1 (z) − V h0 (z)]
= (1 − δ − λh)[Wh1 (z) − Wh0 (z)]
= (1 − δ − λh)[w − b − l + β(1 − δ − λh) ˆSh],
where ˆSh = w−(b+l)1−β(1−δ−λh) represents the steady state difference of the household’s
continuation values. From equation (6), we have that the difference in value
functions between different employment status for the firm is given by
U
f
1 − Uf0 = (1 − δ − λf )(V f1 − V f0 )
= (1 − δ − λf )[R − w + β(1 − δ) ˆSf ],
where ˆSf = R−w1−β(1−δ) is the steady state difference of the firm’s continuation value
and the firm’s revenues, R, which are given by
R = y + αf [(1 + sq)ρz − c(q)].
The continuation values for the firm and the household having been specified,
the Nash bargaining problem with firm’s bargaining power η can be written as
follows:
max
w
[
w − b − l + β(1 − δ − λh) ˆSh
]1−η [
R − w + β(1 − δ) ˆSf ]η .
The solution to this problem is given by
w = η[1 − β(1 − δ)](b + l) + (1 − η)[1 − β(1 − δ − λh)]R
1 − β(1 − δ) + (1 − η)βλh .
Knowing the household wage in the LM, w, as well as the firm’s revenues, R,
we can substitute these expressions and determine the corresponding free entry
condition, which is given by
k − a = λf η
{
y − (b + l) + αf [(1 + sq)ρd − c(q)]
}
(r + δ) + (1 − η)λh ,
where r is the real interest rate.
To simplify things, let us use the Beveridge curve, which describes the relation-
ship between unemployment and the job vacancy rate. In the steady state we have
that (1 − u)δ = N (u, v), which implicitly defines v = v(u), so we can rewrite
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αf = M(1,1−u)1−u λf = N [u,v(u)]v(u) , λh = N [u,v(u)]u . Recalling that ρd = g(q), the free
entry condition can be written as
k − a =
N [u,v(u)]
v(u)
η{y − (b + l) + M(1,1−u)1−u [(1 + sq)g(q) − c(q)]}
(r + δ) + (1 − η)N [u,v(u)]
u
, (12)
which we refer from now on as the MP curve. The MP curve, given by equation
(12), relates the firm’s optimal (u, q), which depends on different tax instruments,
namely, the production and vacancy subsidies and the tax rate on labor income.
PROPOSITION 2. The MP curve slopes downward in (u, q) space. It passes
through (1, q), where q > 0, if (k− a)(r + δ) > η[y − (b+ l)] + (1 − sq)g(q∗)−
c(q∗), and it passes through (u¯, 0), where u¯ > 0, if (k−a)(r+δ) ≤ η[y−(b+ l)].
The MP curve determines the unemployment rate u as in Mortensen and Pis-
sarides (1994), except that the total surplus (the term in braces) includes not just
y − b − l but also the expected gain from trade in the decentralized market.
Different from Berentsen et al. (2011), the labor market equilibrium can be driven
by multiple fiscal policies. The following lemma summarizes the effects of fiscal
policy instruments on MP curve.
LEMMA 2. The MP curve moves upward when the unemployment benefit b in-
creases. The MP curve moves downward when the monetary subsidy to production
sq or the vacancy subsidy a increases.
Intuitively, there are three effects from an increase in u, all of which encourage
entry: (i) it is easier for firms to hire; (ii) it is harder for households to get hired,
which lowers w; (iii) it is easier for firms to compete in the DM market.
In contrast to the LW curve, a vacancy subsidy affects the firms’ optimal (u, q),
which translates into shifts in the MP curve.
4. MONETARY EQUILIBRIUM
We break the analysis of equilibrium into three parts. First, following Lagos and
Wright (2005), we determine the value of DM production measured by q, taking
unemployment u as given, the LW curve. We then determine u, taking q as given,
as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1996), which yields the MP curve previously
derived. It is convenient to depict these two relationships graphically in (u, q)
space with the LW and MP curves; see Figure 2. Their intersection determines the
equilibrium unemployment rate and the value of money (u, q), from which all of
the other endogenous variables easily follow.
As in Berentsen et al. (2011), there may be multiple equilibria. In particular, the
previous figure shows two cases, labeled 2 and 3, where the MP curve intersects
the vertical axis at some q1. In this case, there either exist multiple monetary steady
states, as shown by curve 2, or no monetary steady states, as shown by curve 3.
In either case there also exists a nonmonetary steady state at u =1 and q =0. In
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FIGURE 2. Monetary equilibrium.
these nonmonetary equilibria, the DM market shuts down, and this means the LW
market also shuts down. In case 3, this is the only possible equilibrium; in case 2,
however, there are also monetary equilibria with the DM and labor markets both
open and u < 1. In case 1, recall that even if q =0, there is still the standard LW
equilibrium with u < 1.
PROPOSITION 3. Steady state equilibrium exists. If (k − a)(r + δ) ≥ η[y −
(b + l)], there is a nonmonetary steady state at (1,0), and a monetary steady state
may also exist. If (k − a)(r + δ) < η[y − (b + l)], there is a nonmonetary steady
state at (uˆ, 0), where uˆ ∈ (0, 1) is the intersection between the MP curve and
horizontal axis, and at least one monetary steady state. If the monetary steady
state is unique, a rise in i or b decreases q and increases u in equilibrium, whereas
a rise in a increases q and decreases u in equilibrium.
Aruoba et al. (2007) emphasize that in the Lagos and Wright (2005) frameworks,
Nash bargaining generates nonmonotonic surpluses for buyers, which lead to
inefficient DM production. Moreover, from Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), we
know that if the Hoisos condition is not satisfied, the economic environment will
have inefficient outcomes. These two properties are inherited by our environment,
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thus leaving a role for monetary and fiscal policies. To determine which precise
policies, we first characterize the first best allocation in the next section.
5. EFFICIENT ALLOCATION
In this section, we explore the efficient allocation by establishing a social planner’s
problem. The social planner can choose the trade volume q in a pairwise matching
in DM, which affects the intensive margin, and the vacancy number v, which affects
the extensive margin. However, the social planner cannot affect the matching
process in either the LM market or the DM market. Therefore, the efficiency in
this model is constrained by matching frictions. Notice that, for the LM market in
an arbitrary period t , ut−1 unemployed workers match with vt−1 vacancies match
and generate ut matches in the DM market through ut = ut−1 + (1 − ut−1)δ +
N (ut−1, vt−1). The social planner’s problem is then as follows:
J (u) = max
q,v
{
−vk
β
+ uˆl + (1 − uˆ)y +M(1, 1 − uˆ)[ν(q) − c(q)] + β ˆJ (uˆ)
}
s.t. uˆ = u + (1 − u)δ −N (u, v).
Because v is chosen before a period starts, its value is discounted by 1/β.
Notice that the choice of q does not depend on the state variable u. The first-order
condition with respect to q is simply ν ′(q) = c′(q). The first-order condition with
respect to v gives the expression for ˆJ ′(uˆ):
ˆJ ′(uˆ) =
− k
β
+ {y − l +M2(1, 1 − uˆ)[ν(q) − c(q)]}N2(u, v)
βN2(u, v) .
Next, by applying the envelope theorem, we have
J ′(u) = [1 − δ −N1(u, v)]
{
l − y −M2(1, 1 − uˆ)[ν(q) − c(q)] + β ˆJ ′(uˆ)
}
.
We only focus on the steady state, where u = uˆ. Substituting the expression of
ˆJ ′(uˆ) into the last equation, we have the following social planner’s Euler equation:
k = N2(u, v) {y − l +M2(1, 1 − u)[ν(q) − c(q)]}1
β
− 1 + δ +N1(u, v)
.
According to the steady-state condition N (u, v) = (1 − u)δ, we can implicitly
define v = v(u). And given the fact that 1
β
= 1 + r , where r is the real interest
rate, we know that the constrained efficient allocation (q∗, u∗) must satisfy the
relationship
k = N2(u
∗, v(u∗)) {y − l +M2(1, 1 − u∗)[ν(q∗) − c(q∗)]}
r + δ +N1(u∗, v(u∗)) .
The next proposition proves the existence and uniqueness for the constrained
efficiency under CES matching function specification.
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FIGURE 3. Uniqueness of efficient allocation.
PROPOSITION 4. When the matching technologies in the LM and DM are
given byN (u, v) = uσv1−σ andM(B, S) = Bγ S1−γ , respectively, there exists a
unique social optimal plan given by θ∗ ≡ v∗/u∗ and q∗.
Figure 3 provides a graphical summary of Proposition 4.
Now that the first best is characterized, we can determine if fiscal and monetary
instruments can implement such an allocation.
6. OPTIMAL MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICIES
The government’s problem consists of choosing inflation, unemployment benefits,
and tax and subsidy rates that maximize social welfare subject to the constraint
that production and consumption in all markets are stationary monetary equilibria.
Thus, we are contemplating an environment in which the government sets an
inflationary and fiscal plan that will not change over time. In the next subsection
we explore whether there exists a set of policies that can replicate the social
planner’s allocation (u∗, v∗, q∗).
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6.1. Benchmark
As a baseline situation, let us consider an economy where the government does not
provide unemployment insurance, b, nor the vacancy subsidy, a, so that there is no
need to tax dividend income, τd = 0. Let us further assume that the government
sets sq = s∗q , the subsidy rate that can achieve q∗ for α∗h, which corresponds to the
optimal matching whereu = u∗. The next lemma ensures that it is possible to do so.
LEMMA 3. Consider any given value of the buyer’s bargaining power, 0 <
φ ≤ 1, and any given inflation rate, π ≥ β − 1. Then there exists a value s∗q that
achieves the first-best allocation in the DM market.
Lemma 3 indicates that, by using a proper production subsidy rate s∗q , efficiency
in a decentralized market can always be achieved for any unemployment level
u even for inflation rates away from the Friedman rule. The subsidies on the
production exchanged in DM encourages sellers to produce up to the efficient
level. However, these subsidies cannot address the inefficiency in LM if the Hosios
rule is not satisfied. Note that in a bargaining environment the Hosios rule depends
solely on the underlying parameters of the model. If these do not satisfy the Hosios
rule, inefficiency will be observed, allowing a role for active fiscal policies.
To correct the inflationary distortion, we follow Gomis-Porqueras and Peralta-
Alva (2010). The monetary authority injects money at different times within a
period to pay a production subsidy in the DM as well as to affect the money
supply at the end of the CM. Thus the corresponding budgets constrains are
(1 − u∗)sqρd∗ = τDMM∗,
(1 + τDM)(1 + τCM) = 1 + π.
Observe that the availability of lump-sum monetary transfers at the end of
the centralized market can neutralize any increase of the money supply from
the payment of monetary subsidies in the centralized market (where we measure
inflation). Thus we can deviate from the Friedman rule.
The resulting labor market equilibrium, MP curve, can be written as follows:
[(r + δ)θσ + (1 − η)θ ]k = η{y − l + (1 + δθσ−1)γ [(1 + s∗q )g(q∗) − c(q∗)]}.
Rearranging the social planner’s solution and the equilibrium MP curve, re-
spectively, we have the following relationships:
[(r + δ)θσ + σθ ] k
(1 − σ) = y − l + (1 + δθ
σ−1)γ (1 − γ )[ν(q∗) − c(q∗)],
(EF)
[(r + δ)θσ + (1 − η)θ ]k
η
= y − l + (1 + δθσ−1)γ [(1 + s∗q )g(q∗) − c(q∗)].
(MP)
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In this search environment, there are efficiencies in both LM and DM markets.
Although the government uses the subsidy s∗q to correct the trade inefficiency in
DM, the efficient unemployment rate θ∗ is not guaranteed if there are no further
active policies. We use θMP to denote the equilibrium market tightness when
sq = s∗q has been chosen. We summarize the relative value of θMP when compared
to θ∗ in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 5. When the trade efficiency is attained by setting qMP = q∗,
we have following properties regarding market tightness θMP in LM:
• when σ = 1−η (Hosios’s rule) and (1−γ )[ν(q∗)−q∗] = (1+ s∗q )g(q∗)−
c(q∗), θMP = θ∗;
• when σ > 1−η and (1−γ )[ν(q∗)−q∗] < (1+s∗q )g(q∗)−c(q∗), θMP ≥ θ∗;
• when σ < 1−η and (1−γ )[ν(q∗)−q∗] > (1+s∗q )g(q∗)−c(q∗), θMP ≤ θ∗.
Proposition 5 is intuitive. The efficiency in LM depends on whether firms and
workers are properly compensated in the matching and bargaining processes of
both LM and DM. When Hosios’s rule holds, the conventional inefficiency in
LM is eliminated. However, on top of Hosios’s rule, firms and workers need to be
compensated by their contribution to DM matching so that the efficiency in LM can
be implemented. This happens when (1−γ )[ν(q∗)−q∗] = (1+s∗q )g(q∗)−c(q∗),
where the LHS is a firm’s contribution to generating surplus in DM and the RHS
is the firm’s real payoff in DM as an equilibrium outcome. When σ ≥ 1 − η and
(1 − γ )[ν(q∗)− q∗] < (1 + s∗q )g(q∗)− c(q∗), firms are favored in the bargaining
of both LM and DM and have a larger incentive to post vacancies. Therefore,
θMP > θ∗. The θMP < θ∗ result can be seen through similar reasoning. However,
when bargaining in the LM is firm-biased (worker-biased) and bargaining in the
DM is worker-biased (firm-biased), the value of market tightness is not clear,
because these opposite effects may counterbalance each other.
An immediate implication of our previous results is that, when we implement
efficiency in DM by choosing s∗q , efficiency in the labor market may not be
achieved. This depends on the underlying parameters governing the matching
processes in the labor and goods markets as well as the bargaining power of firms
and workers. In the next subsection we explore whether active fiscal policies can
help us achieve efficiency.
6.2. Active Fiscal Instruments and Efficiency
An important insight of the previous section was the importance of the DM
production subsidy in helping achieve efficient production in the DM. Thus, after
setting s∗q , the government needs to choose a vacancy subsidy, a, unemployment
insurance (or tax), b, and a labor income tax rate to move the MP curve so that
efficiency can be achieved in the LM and DM markets. In other words, we need
to specify policies such that θMP = θ∗ and q = q∗. In order to determine the right
set of policies, we need to determine the efficient labor market gap, i.e., θMP − θ∗.
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Recall that the MP curve was given by
[
(r + δ)θσ + (1 − η)θ] k − a
η
= y−(b+l)+(1+δθσ−1)γ [(1+s∗q )g(q∗)−c(q∗)].
From Lemma 2, we know that the MP curve shifts downward (i.e., u decreases for
any fixed q) in (u, q) space when the vacancy subsidy, a, increases or unemploy-
ment benefits, b, decrease. Intuitively, if the government wants a larger vacancy–
unemployment ratio θ = v
u
, the government can either raise firms’ incentive to
recruit, or lower unemployed workers’ welfare, or do both.
For an initial set of fiscal and monetary policies, if the vacancy–unemployment
ratio is higher than the efficient level, θMP > θ∗, government may want to tax firms
or subsidize the unemployed. Thus in principle (u∗, q∗) is a possible allocation
that belongs to the equilibrium MP curve.
Before we determine the appropriate policy instruments, we need to consider
the different possibilities when sq = s∗q . First, if the MP curve is to the right
of (u∗, q∗), the government can change the MP allocations by increasing a or
decreasing b until the MP curve crosses (u∗, q∗). Then using the appropriate
combination of policies we can construct a pair of LW and MP curves that crosses
at (u∗, q∗). To be an efficient market equilibrium, the policy instruments τd , a,
and b need to satisfy the government budget constraint, which is given by
v∗a + u∗b = τd ∗,
which holds at every date. The fact that τd has no effect on the LW and MP curves
is going to be important, as this instrument can help the government balance its
budget. After the government sets a and b to shift the MP curve so that the LW and
MP curves cross at (u∗, q∗), the fiscal authority chooses τd to balance the budget.
However, if the MP curve is to the left of (u∗, q∗) when sq = s∗q , θMP < θ∗, it
is still possible to achieve efficiency by setting a < 0, thus moving the MP curve
to the right. But because we can at most set a = −k, efficiency in the DM market
cannot be attained if the MP curve is too far away from (u∗, q∗). See Figure 4.
Define ζ as follows:
ζ = (1 − γ )[v(q
∗) − q∗]
(1 + s∗q )g(q∗, s∗q ) − c(q∗)
.
Generally, if ζ > 1, the government can always achieve labor market efficiency
by setting positive a and b as stated in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 6. When the Hosios rule holds, labor market efficiency can be
achieved through appropriate fiscal policies {a∗, b∗, τ ∗d } that satisfy the following
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FIGURE 4. Existence of optimal policies.
conditions:
k
k − a =
y
y − (b + l) = ζ,
v∗a∗ + u∗b∗ = τ ∗d ∗ .
• When firms are favored in both the LM and DM, i.e.,
σ ≥ 1 − η and (1 − γ )[v(q∗) − q∗] ≤ (1 + s∗q )g(q∗) − c(q∗),
to achieve labor market efficiency, the government needs to implement a
small positive or even negative a and increase b.
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TABLE 1. Welfare-maximizing
policies
Policies Values
sq 0.356
τd 0.547
a 0.282
• When workers are favored in both the LM and DM, i.e.,
σ ≤ 1 − η and (1 − γ )[v(q∗) − q∗] ≥ (1 + s∗q )g(q∗) − c(q∗),
to achieve labor market efficiency, government needs to increase a and
decrease b.
6.3. Numerical Example
For a given parameterization, the government’s problem can easily be solved
with standard numerical methods. For ease of comparison with existing analyses,
we follow closely the parameterization of Berentsen et al. (2011). These authors
consider the preferences
v(q) = Aq
(1−α)
1 − α ,
and the values for the underlying parameters are β = 0.992, l = 0.1, y = 3,
A = 1.86, δ = 0.05k = 8, σ = 0.28, γ = 0.28, η = 0.28, φ = 0.275,
and α = 0.17. Given this structure, we analyze the quantitative implications for
optimal fiscal and monetary policies.
For this particular parameterization, we find that there exists a unique monetary
equilibrium. Nevertheless, there are multiple fiscal and monetary policies that yield
the efficient allocation. The optimal fiscal and monetary policies are reported in
Table 1 where π = β − 1, b = 0 with optimal unemployment, vacancy, DM
production 0.076, 0.037, and 12.863, respectively.
With this particular parameterization, we obtain a unique monetary equilibrium
that exhibits an endogenous long-run Phillips curve. The government is able to
implement a vacancy subsidy that shifts the MP curve enough so that q∗ and u∗
belong to both the MP and LW curves.
7. CONCLUSION
The objective of this paper is to provide a better understanding of the interactions
between monetary and fiscal policies in an economic environment with microeco-
nomic foundations for fiat money and unemployment. The underlying framework
is tractable where search-and-bargaining frictions are considered to create a role
for money and to deliver unemployment as equilibrium outcomes.
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One of our main results is to show that, even when terms of trade in the decen-
tralized market are given by Nash’s bargaining solution, some of the inefficiencies
in the Berentsen et al. (2011) framework can be restored with appropriate fiscal
policies. In particular, when lump-sum monetary transfers are possible, a produc-
tion subsidy financed by money printing can increase output in the decentralized
market and a vacancy subsidy financed by a dividend tax even when the Hosios
rule does not hold.
We also showed there exist multiple subsidies and (sometimes strictly positive)
inflation rates that yield the efficient allocation. The Friedman rule is one of the
possible policy options that yields efficiency. Finally, the Friedman rule is always
an optimal policy regardless of the bargaining power of the buyer.
Finally, under any of the operating procedures for monetary and fiscal policy
considered in this paper, with or without lump-sum taxes, large welfare gains are
achieved by having fiscal and monetary policies in place. Thus, ignoring active
fiscal policies can be quite costly.
The findings of this paper confirm the conjecture of Kocherlakota (2005)
and Wright (2005) that fiscal and monetary policies have important interactions
in frameworks with micro foundations for the existence of fiat money; thus,
they should always be jointly considered in the design of optimal government
111 policy.
NOTES
1. See Ireland (1999), Ribba (2003), and Berentsen et al. (2011) for more on this issue.
2. As shown in Hosios (1990), if the worker’s share of the matching surplus is too small, there will
be an excessive creation of vacancies due to the high profitability of a match for the firm.
3. Recall that we have normalized B = 1.
4. Recall that agents in DM are anonymous, so that credit as a medium of exchange is not feasible.
5. This property of Nash bargaining disappears when the axiom of independence of irrelevant
alternatives is replaced with the axiom of monotonicity, as first proposed by Kalai and Smorodinsky
(1975).
6. For real economies we refer to Chae (2002), who investigates tax incidence in a two-person
bargaining model where one party is taxed and derives some general results. The condition under
which the nontaxed party shares the burden of taxes (or benefit of subsidies) is characterized. Sufficient
conditions for the tax burden to fall entirely on the taxed party are given. Also, Chae (2002) provides
a sufficient condition for the nontaxed party actually to benefit from taxation.
REFERENCES
Aruoba, Boragan, Guillaume Rocheteau, and Chris Waller (2007) Bargaining and the value of money.
Journal of Monetary Economics 54, 2636–2655.
Berentsen, Aleksander, Guido Menzio, and Randall Wright (2011) Inflation and unemployment in the
long run. American Economic Review 101, 371–398.
Berentsen, Aleksander, Guillaume Rocheteau, and Shouyong Shi (2007) Friedman meets Hosios:
Efficiency in search models of money. Economic Journal 117, 174–195.
Chae, Suchan (2002) Tax incidence with bargaining. Economics Letters 77, 199–204.
Cooley, Thomas and Vincenzo Quadrini (1999) A neoclassical model of the Phillips curve relation.
Journal of Monetary Economics 44, 165–193.
1350 PEDRO GOMIS-PORQUERAS, BENOIˆT JULIEN, AND CHENGSI WANG
Cooley, Thomas and Vincenzo Quadrini (2004) Optimal monetary policy in a Phillips-curve world.
Journal of Economic Theory 118, 174–20.
Feinman, Joshua (1993) Reserve requirements: History, current practice, and potential reform. Federal
Reserve Bulletin (June), 569–589.
Friedman, Milton (1959) A Program for Monetary Stability. New York: Fordham University Press.
Gomis-Porqueras, Pedro and Adrian Peralta-Alva (2010) Optimal monetary and fiscal policies in a
search theoretic model of monetary exchange. European Economic Review 54, 331–344.
Hosios, Arthur (1990) On the efficiency of matching and related models of search unemployment.
Review of Economic Studies 57, 279–298.
Ireland, Peter (1999) Does the time-consistency problem explain the behavior of inflation in the United
States? Journal of Monetary Economics 44, 279–291.
Kalai, Ehud and Meir Smorodinsky (1975) Other solutions to Nash’s bargaining problem. Economet-
rica 43, 513–518.
Kocherlakota, Narayana (2005) Optimal monetary policy: What we know and what we don’t know.
International Economic Review 46, 305–316.
Kumar, Alok (2008) Inflation and the dispersion of real wages. International Economic Review 49,
377–399.
Lagos, Ricardo and Randall Wright (2005) A unified framework for monetary theory and policy
analysis. Journal of Political Economy 113, 463–484.
Lehmann, Etienne (2006) A Search Model of Unemployment and Inflation. IZA Discussion Paper
2194.
Mortensen, Dale and Chris Pissarides (1994) Job creation and job destruction in the theory of unem-
ployment. Review of Economic Studies 61, 397–415.
Ribba, Antonio (2003) Short-run and long-run interaction between inflation and unemployment in the
USA. Applied Economics Letters 10, 373–376.
Tolley, George (1957) Providing for the growth of the money supply. Journal of Political Economy 65,
477–84.
Walsh, Carl (2003) Labor market search and monetary shocks. In Altug Sumru, Chadha Jagjit, and
Nolan Charles (eds.), Elements of Dynamic Macroeconomic Analysis, pp. 451–486. Cambridge
University Press.
Wright, Randall (2005) Introduction to models of monetary economies: II. The next generation.
International Economic Review 46, 715–729.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
The LW curve determines q for a given u exactly as in Lagos and Wright (2005), except
for the production subsidy qs in g′(q). We implicitly impose mild assumptions to guarantee
that ν ′(q)/g′(q) is globally decreasing in q. Examples of such conditions can be (i) ν ′ is
log-concave or (ii) φ ≈ 1. Thus, when u increases, the LHS of equation (11) increases; q
will decrease, as ν ′(q)/g′(q) is a decreasing function of q; and therefore the LW curve is
downward-sloping.
If u = 0 and sq = 0, q < q∗ as in Lagos and Wright (2005). If u = 1, it implies
that the LHS of (11) goes to ∞ and therefore q → 0 as ν ′(0) = ∞. When workers own
full bargaining power, i.e., φ = 1, and the Friedman rule i → 0 is implemented, we have
ν ′(q)/c′(q) → 1, i.e., q → q∗. Furthermore, when i → 0, the RHS of (11) goes to 0 so
that q is independent of u. 
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PROOF OF LEMMA 1
It is straightforward to see that when u is fixed, q decreases as i increases, given that
ν ′(a)/g′(q) is decreasing in q. From the representation of g(q, sq) and by applying the
implicit function theorem, we have that
∂q
∂sq
= − φzν
′(q)
φ{−ν ′ + ν ′′[z(1 + sq) − q]} − (1 − φ)ν ′ .
Thus, given ν ′ ≥ 0, ν ′′ < 0 and z(1 + sq) − q ≥ 0, we have ∂q/∂sq ≥ 0. Therefore, a
higher monetary subsidy to production shifts the LW curve upward. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
First, notice that N (u,v)
v
and M(1,1−u)1−u are increasing in u, whereas N (u, v)/u is decreasing
in u. Then, when other parameters are unchanged, a higher u will lead to a lower q when
q ≤ q∗, given that g′(q) > 0. The MP curve is thus downward-sloping in (u, q) space.
Second, multiplying both sides of equation (12) by (r + δ) + (1 − η)N (u,v)
u
, we have
(k − a) {(r + δ) + (1 − η)N [u,v(u)]
u
}
= N [u,v(u)]
v(u)
η{y − (b + l) + M(1,1−u)1−u [(1 + sq)g(q) − c(q)]}.
The LHS reaches its minimum when N (u, v)/u → 0. The RHS reaches its maximum
when N (u, v)/v → 1 and M(1,1−u)1−u → 1. Thus, if
(k − a)(r + δ) ≥ η {y − (b + l) + [(1 + sq)g(q∗) − c(q∗)]},
the market will shut down. Finally, suppose (k − a)(r + δ) ≥ η(y − [b + l]); then q must
be positive at u = 1, otherwise the equation cannot hold. 
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
The effect of policy instruments a and b on u and q are immediate from equation (12).
Also notice that
d(1 + sq)g(q)
dsq
= g(q) + (1 + sq) dg(q)
dq
dq
dsq
≥ 0.
This implies that when u and other parameters are fixed, q decreases as sq increases. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
We only focus on steady state equilibrium. When (k − a)(r + δ) ≥ η(y − (b + l)), the
MP curve crosses (1, q) by Lemma 2. It is clear from Figure 2 that the MP curve may
(e.g., MP2) or may not (e.g., MP3) intersect the LW curve. However, because the LW curve
crosses (1, 0), there always exists a nonmonetary steady state where there is no production
and trade at all. When (k − a)(r + δ) < η[y − (b + l)], the MP curve enters (u, q) space
from (u¯, 0)(e.g., MP1). Therefore, there exists a nonmonetary steady state (u¯, 0) and at least
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one monetary steady state (e.g., point A in Figure 2). There may exist multiple monetary
steady state (e.g., point B and C in Figure 2).
Suppose a monetary steady state exists. Because both the LW and MP curves are
downward-sloping, any shift of one curve creates a new monetary equilibrium (if one
exists), with u and q changing in opposite directions. By Lemma 1, a higher i makes the
LW curve move downward and thus decreases q and increases u. By Lemma 2, a rise in a
or a decrease in b makes the MP curve shift upward and thus leads to a steady state with
higher q and lower u. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
By choosing Cobb–Douglas matching technologies and using the Beveridge curve
uN (1, θ) = N (u, v) = (1 − u)δ, we have N1(u, v) = σθ1−σ , N2(u, v) = (1 − σ)θ−σ ,
and M2(1, 1 − u) = (1 − γ )(1 + δθσ−1)γ . The social planner’s optimal choice can be
written as
[(r + δ)θσ + σθ ]k = (1 − σ) {y − l + (1 − γ )(1 + δθσ−1)γ [v(q∗) − c(q∗)]}.
The left-hand side (LHS) tends to 0 as θ → 0, whereas it tends to ∞ as θ → ∞. And
∂LHS
∂θ
= [(r + δ)θσ−1 + 1]σk > 0.
The right-hand side (RHS) tends to ∞ as θ → 0, whereas it tends to H = (1 −
σ) [y − l + (1 − γ )[v(q∗) − c(q∗)]] as θ → ∞. And
∂RHS
∂θ
= −(1 − σ)2(1 − γ )γ σ [v(q∗) − c(q∗)](1 + δθσ−1)γ−1 < 0.
Thus, there exists a unique θ∗ that satisfies social optimality. Given q∗ is also unique, there
exist an unique social optimal plan given by θ∗ and q∗. 
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Take the L–W curve iM(1,1−u) = ν
′(q)
gq (q,sq )
− 1 as given and assume c(q) = q, where
gq(q, s) = φ(1 + sq)ν
′(q)2 + (1 − φ)ν ′(q) − (1 − φ)φν ′(q)[(1 + sq)ν(q) − q]
[φ(1 + sq)ν ′(q) + 1 − φ]2 .
The optimal policy requires the government to pick sq given q such that gq(q, s) = 1,
which is the true marginal cost. Such a policy eliminates any bargaining inefficiency that
arises. Under such a subsidy policy we have
i
M(1, 1 − u) = ν
′(q) − 1,
which means that q only depends on i. As a result setting i = 0 (i.e., π = β −1) eliminates
the time cost of holding money yields, q∗. Given this policy, we can now solve for the
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optimal subsidy. We have
1 = φ(1 + sq)ν
′(q)2 + (1 − φ)ν ′(q) − (1 − φ)φv′′(q)[(1 + sq)ν(q) − q]
[φ(1 + sq)ν ′(q) + 1 − φ]2 ,
which is a quadratic equation in sq . Imposing ν ′(q∗) = 1, we can solve for a positive s∗q .
Also notice that, given that i = 0 is chosen, s∗q does not depend on u. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
Comparing the social planner’s allocation (EF) and the market equilibrium allocation (MP),
we can consider three different cases.
Case 1: σ = 1 − η. The matching elasticity with respect to u, uN2(u, v)/N (u, v), is σ
under our Cobb–Douglas specification. Hosios (1990) states that the labor market efficiency
is going to be achieved whenever the bargaining power reflects the party’s contribution to
matching, i.e., σ = 1−η. Thus this scenario satisfies the so-called Hosios rule. In this case,
the LHS of equation (EF) and the LHS of equation (MP) are equal for the same market
tightness θ . Thus, if the RHSs of equations (EF) and (MP) satisfy
(1 − γ )[ν(q∗) − c(q∗)] = (1 + s∗q )g(q∗) − c(q∗)
or equivalently
ν(q∗)
c(q∗)
= (1 − γ )(1 + φs
∗
q ) − (1 − φ)
(1 − γ )(1 + φs∗q ) − (1 − φ)(1 + s∗q )
= 1 + (1 − φ)s
∗
q
(1 − γ )(1 + φs∗q ) − (1 − φ)(1 + s∗q )
,
we must have that the equilibrium labor market tightness θMP equals the efficient tightness
θ∗. This in turn implies that the optimal policy scheme (s∗q , π∗) implements the efficient
outcome in both markets.
Now suppose that (1 − γ )[ν(q∗) − q∗] > (1 + s∗q )g(q∗) − q∗. Then, for the same
market tightness θ , the RHS of equation (EF) is larger than the RHS of equation (MP).
As a result, we have that θMP < θ∗ when qMP = q∗. Similarly, if (1 − γ )[ν(q∗) − q∗] <
(1 + s∗q )g(q∗) − q∗, we have θMP > θ∗, given that qMP = q∗.
Case 2: σ > 1 − η. The Hosios rule is no longer holding because of the excessive
bargaining power of firms. The LHS of equation (EF) is larger than the LHS of equation
(MP) for the same θ . If (1 − γ )[ν(q∗) − q∗] ≤ (1 + s∗q )g(q∗) − q∗, we must have that
θMP ≥ θ∗ when qMP = q∗. If (1 − γ )[ν(q∗)− q∗] > (1 + s∗q )g(q∗)− q∗, the relative value
of θMP compared to θ∗ is ambiguous.
Case 3: σ < 1 − η. The Hosios rule is not satisfied because of the excessive bargaining
power of workers. The LHS of equation (EF) is smaller than the LHS of equation (MP) for
the same θ . If (1 − γ )[ν(q∗) − q∗] ≥ (1 + s∗q )g(q∗) − q∗, we must have θMP ≤ θ∗ when
qMP = q∗. If (1 − γ )[ν(q∗) − q∗] < (1 + s∗q )g(q∗) − q∗, the relative value of θMP when
compared to θ∗ is ambiguous. 
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6
First, suppose that Hosios’s rule holds. From equations (EF) and (12), it is easy to see that
θ∗ can be achieved in the labor market if and only if k
k−a ,
y
y−(b+l) , and
(1−γ )[ν(q∗)−c(q∗)]
(1+s∗q )g(q∗)−c(q∗) are
of the same value. The first two fractions can be adjusted by choosing policy instruments
a and b. Whether the efficiency can be resorted depends on the value of the last fraction.
Suppose that (1−γ )[ν(q
∗)−c(q∗)]
(1+s∗q )g(q∗)−c(q∗) = ζ > 1. All we need is to choose a and b such that
k
k − a =
y
y − (b + l) = ζ.
This can be easily done by choosing nonnegative policy instruments. Suppose that ζ < 1.
Now we need to choose negative a. But because the entry tax a cannot be less than −k and
also is restricted by budget constraint, the feasible set of policies is restricted. Thus, only
when ζ is not too small can, efficiency be achieved.
When Hosios’s rule does not hold, choice of policy becomes complicated, as it depends
on the detailed parameters of the matching and bargaining process. However, the direction
that leads to efficiency is clear. When
σ > 1 − η and (1 − γ )[v(q∗) − q∗] ≤ (1 + s∗q )g(q∗) − c(q∗),
the MP curve determined by (MP) is lower than (u∗, q∗) by Proposition 5. Thus, large b
and small (or even negative) a should be chosen. A similar argument can be formed for the
opposite case.
Of course, all there policy combinations should satisfy the government’s budget con-
straint v∗a∗ + u∗b∗ = τ ∗d ∗ +α∗f ∗w. 
